The safety and quality of care are two of the central dimensions of health care. It is increasingly clear that both could be much better, and in recent years it has become easier to measure safety and quality. In addition, the public is—with good justification—demanding measurement and accountability, and payment for services increasingly will be based on performance in these areas. Thus, physicians must learn about these two domains, how they can be improved, and the relative strengths and limitations of the current ability to measure them.
Safety and quality are closely related but do not completely overlap. The Institute of Medicine has suggested in a seminal series of reports that safety is the first part of quality and that health care first must guarantee that it will deliver safe care, although quality is also pivotal. In the end, it is likely that more net clinical benefit will be derived from improving quality than from improving safety, though both are important and safety is in many ways more tangible to the public. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter will address issues relating to the safety of care and the second will cover quality of care.
Safety theory clearly points out that individuals make errors all the time. Think of driving home from the hospital; you intend to stop and pick up a quart of milk on the way home but find yourself entering your driveway without realizing how you got there. Everybody uses low-level, semiautomatic behavior for many activities in daily life; this kind of error is called a "slip." Slips occur often during care delivery, e.g., when people intend to write an order but forget because they have to complete another action first. "Mistakes," by contrast, are errors of a higher level; they occur in new or nonstereotypic situations in which conscious decisions are being made. An example would be dosing a medication with which a physician is not familiar. The strategies used to prevent slips and mistakes are often different.
Systems theory suggests that most accidents occur as the result of a series of small failures that happen to line up in an individual instance so that an accident can occur (Fig. 10-1). It also suggests that most individuals in an industry such as health care are trying to do the right thing (e.g., deliver safe care), and most accidents thus can be seen as resulting from defects in the systems. Correspondingly, systems should be designed both to make errors less likely and to identify those which do occur, as some inevitably will.
"Swiss cheese" diagram. Reason has argued that most accidents occur when a series of "latent failures" in a system are present and happen to line up in ...
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